Space sovereignty: from awareness to strategic advantage
- il y a 15 heures
- 5 min de lecture
With thousands of satellites launched each year, Earth's orbit is more congested than ever. At the same time, geopolitical tensions are extending into the space domain, making the protection of space infrastructure a strategic priority. In this context, situational awareness in space is essential for understanding what is happening there and who is present. But knowledge alone is not enough. The challenge lies in transforming it into an operational advantage. To achieve this, the European Union may well hold the key to the future.
By Sarah Pineau
The spatial extension of conflicts
Over the past five years, global space activity has reached unprecedented levels: the number of rocket launches into Earth's orbit has tripled in five years, having remained below 100 for the previous thirty years; at the same time, the total mass placed into orbit by these rockets has increased sixfold over the same period.¹ This congestion is not without risk. The Kessler Syndrome — a scenario in which cascading collisions between space debris could render certain orbits permanently unusable — is no longer a theoretical hypothesis. The European Space Agency currently tracks more than 36,500 objects larger than 10 cm in Earth's orbit. Russia's antisatellite (ASAT) test conducted in November 2021 (Nudol system) alone generated more than 1,500 trackable debris fragments, forcing the ISS to conduct several emergency avoidance manoeuvres. Moreover, long a venue for international cooperation, space is now at the heart of geostrategic rivalries. Air Force Major General Vincent Chusseau, the current Space Commander, observes: “Space has become both a lever of power and a new arena of confrontation. It is indispensable to our societies as well as to our military operations.” Thus, between 2019 and 2025, the number of active satellites worldwide increased by 440%, rising from 2,200 to 13,000… 60% of which belong to the American company SpaceX. China intends to challenge this hegemony with its Guowang project, a constellation of nearly 13,000 satellites whose massive deployment has accelerated since 2024. This orbital power struggle is redefining balances of power for the decades ahead. On crisis theatres, GPS jamming and spoofing have become documented hybrid warfare tools in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Middle East, illustrating the growing porosity between space competition and conventional conflicts. It is now established that military operations rely heavily on satellites: “Our observation, communication and navigation satellites determine our ability to see, decide and act.”
France takes the space challenge head-on
The decision to launch a national space strategy and a Space Command (CDE) was made in 2019, following attempts by a Russian satellite to spy on a Franco-Italian satellite, Athena-Fidus. That same year, NATO recognised space as a fifth domain of operations and conflict. France was thus, in a sense, a pioneer. In terms of capabilities, France possesses real but insufficiently recognised assets. The GRAVES radar — the only European system dedicated to space surveillance in low Earth orbit — makes it possible to detect and catalogue orbital objects without American cooperation. The CSO satellites (Composante Spatiale Optique), successors to Helios, provide a very high-resolution observation capability. Above all, the 2019 space defence strategy crossed an unprecedented doctrinal threshold by adopting an “active defence” posture: future satellites could be equipped with onboard neutralisation means, including high-energy lasers, to protect our orbital assets against hostile manœuvres. In November 2025, the President of the Republic presented a new French space strategy for 2025–2040, based on five pillars: autonomous access to space, industry, defence space, space exploration and cooperation. The announced resources are substantial: an additional €4.2 billion, on top of the €6 billion already allocated to military space by 2030. Today, France accounts for 50% of the European space industry’s revenue and employs one third of its workforce. And yet. In terms of annual economic output, the French space sector represents significantly less than our national cheese production.² In its February 2026 report, the Court of Auditors harshly criticised the CDE, deploring persistent weaknesses in the organisation’s build-up³, incomplete operational capabilities and an unclear acquisition strategy due to persistent differences between the Armed Forces General Staff, the Space Command and the Directorate General of Armaments.
Aiming for european strategic autonomy
A clearly identified challenge, but insufficiently tailored responses: this is the paradox France must overcome to transform its expertise into a strategic advantage. To succeed, the European option appears to be the best path, provided the different national visions can be reconciled. The European Union has many strengths: an excellent education system, a high-performing industry, world-class academic research and state-of-the-art space infrastructure (launch vehicles, satellites, ground systems). Furthermore, aside from autonomous crewed flights, it controls the entire value chain of the sector.⁴ Yet the power gaps remain striking: the global space economy was valued at $630 billion in 2024 (Euroconsult), with a projection of $1,800 billion by 2035. The United States dedicates more than $70 billion annually (civil and military combined), China between $12 and $15 billion, while the ESA’s budget for 2025 stands at €9.1 billion — a real effort, but one that reveals a structural power gap that is difficult to close without pooling. November 2025 saw Germany adopt a Space Security Strategy and the organisation of an ESA Ministerial Conference, whose budgetary commitments increased by 31%. This convergence underscores the need to redefine the balance between national sovereignty and collective ambition. As Sylvain D’Hoine (Sopra Steria) notes, it is “urgent for Europe to develop a truly integrated vision of space, capable of combining industrial autonomy, regulatory consistency, environmental sustainability, security resilience and global competitiveness.”⁵ The question of data sovereignty, an inseparable factor in strategic autonomy, represents another key challenge. European dependence on American data constitutes the blind spot of this ambition. The EUSST (EU Space Surveillance and Tracking), Europe’s space surveillance system, remains reliant on data provided by American allies for nearly 90% of its needs. Galileo, despite its superior precision compared to GPS in PRS mode (regulated public service), remains poorly integrated into the operational systems of European armed forces. The EU is responding with structural initiatives. The European Space Shield, listed among the four priorities of the Commission’s defence readiness roadmap, is expected to be launched in the second half of 2026 to “ensure the protection and resilience of space assets and services.” The European Space Act, published in June 2025 and due to enter into force in 2030, aims to provide the space sector with a comprehensive and harmonised regulatory framework. Above all, the IRIS² constellation (Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite) — comprising 290 satellites, endowed with a budget of €10.6 billion and with deployment also planned for 2030 — represents the cornerstone of European digital sovereignty: secure governmental connectivity, resilience against undersea cable ruptures and reduced dependence on Starlink for critical uses.⁶
2. Ibid
