Absorbing the shock and adapting faster than the adversary

With a probable clash with Russia four years away, the Armed Forces are preparing. The Army, whose role is and will be central, has embarked on a genuine transformation: a change in scale, model and operating methods. Between capability priorities, funding and public-private partnerships, France is collectively preparing for high-intensity conflict. One watchword: be ready, move fast.

AN INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR GENERAL JUSTEL, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE FRENCH ARMY BY MÉLANIE BÉNARD-CROZAT.

©Armée de Terre

The assessment is blunt: "The shock we must prepare for is already under way. The Chief of the Defence Staff sets the horizon at a possible confrontation with Russia within three to four years, but the first stages of aggression — in the cyber and informational domains — have been under way for several years already. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict spilling over into NATO, the Middle East aflame, economic consequences on the home front: crises are everywhere, interconnected, across every domain, with a significant intensification."

The myth of high-intensity conflict "at a distance"

The first misconception to dispel is that France could handle high-intensity conflict without deploying ground troops. "In high-intensity conflict, you do not choose where you fight. The enemy will strike the national territory wherever the target generates strong political repercussions — cyber, sabotage, longrange strikes — as Iran demonstrated against Gulf countries during the American-Israeli strikes." The second truth: "There will be no high-intensity conflict without alliances. NATO and EU commitments will impose reassurance missions and then engagement alongside countries bordering Russia. These postures are already being enacted by the Army, with exercises in Finland, troops in Estonia and Romania, and numerous bilateral deployments in the Gulf during the Iranian crisis. In the event of escalation, the land contribution within NATO would be organised around two missions: reinforcing regional plans from pre-positioned forces — Dacian Fall demonstrated our ability to scale from battalion to brigade — and manning SACEUR's reaction capability through the French Strategic Reserve Corps, one of the two European army corps held in reserve alongside the British, tasked with widening the front, creating strategic dilemmas and recapturing lost ground. This credibility, consolidated during Exercise Orion, extends to the national territory: counter-drone operations, civilian assistance and reserve mobilisation. The battle will be joint. And without the Army, there is no intelligence, no special forces, no cyber."

Ukrainian retex: the premium on adaptation

The theatre is fluid, and so are the lessons drawn from it. "The lessons we were drawing in 2023 are not those of 2026. Beyond drones, robots, trenches and armoured vehicles — words that saturate the capability debate — the decisive lesson can be stated in one sentence: you can only prevail if you are capable of absorbing the shock and adapting faster than the adversary. That is the most structurally significant gap. With comparable equipment, training and doctrine, what separates Kyiv from the Russian war machine is command. Decentralisation, room left for initiative, close cooperation with the civilian and industrial worlds: these are what allow Ukraine, numerically inferior as it is, to out-tempo an adversary operating in a far more centralised fashion. This is a race between two actors who learn quickly. And that pace is not ours at all. The Israel-Hezbollah duel confirms the rule. The Ukrainian theatre also carries two more material lessons. Lethality, first, has reached thresholds unimaginable four years ago: 500 Ukrainian drones launched as far as Moscow in late May, nearly 1,400 missiles and drones fired a few days earlier by Russia. Deep fires now account for a considerable share of destruction. Endurance, second: these conflicts are also wars of stockpiles and production, in which the defence industrial and technological base becomes a weapon in its own right."

Three changes for the transformation

The Army is engaged in a profound transformation.

Change in scale. Counter-insurgency was fought at the level of the combined arms tactical group — the regiment — over limited contact phases. "High-intensity conflict imposes fighting that lasts years, contact zones spanning thousands of kilometres, daily strikes, and coordination from brigade to corps level. We must change scale in command structures, mass, stockpiles, and the capacity to endure." Change in model. The Army bears the hallmarks of adaptation to counter-insurgency: infantry at the core, supporting arms attached, the rear area sanctuarised. "This imbalance does not hold against an adversary dominating the air and electromagnetic domains. The direction is clear: fewer close-combat arms — infantry, cavalry — more supporting arms — artillery, engineers, electronic warfare — more support — medical, maintenance, logistics. Without close protection, without counter-battery, without adequate resupply, the infantry will not last."

Change in operating methods. Decentralisation is becoming a major axis. "The Chief of Staff of the Army distributes levers to units and authorises capability development at the lowest level. To this is added innovation as a mindset: a unit that innovates is a unit that does not merely react." three capability priorities "Three axes structure the capability effort. Lethality: deep fires, loitering munitions, medium and long range, a successor to the Multiple Launch Rocket System (LRU) — to extend fires from brigade to division and corps level. To this are added decision superiority (digital C2, AI) and electronic warfare. Protection: ground-based air defence systems, counter-drone, counter-battery, armoured vehicle cages, basic jamming, counter-IED. We are currently far too limited: we must improve in quality and above all in quantity to absorb saturation on the scale experienced by the Gulf or Ukraine. The DAGUE plan equips reserves and conscripts with less costly equipment adapted to the national territory. And finally endurance: trucks, logistics robots, spare parts, ammunition. If we have emptied the ammunition stockpile after three days, the war ends in failure."

Beyond the LPM: Titan

"The LPM update of €36 billion consolidates an army model that had serious vulnerabilities, without delivering the capability mass required given the Russian force balance on the land segment. We are aware of the effort the Nation has made. That makes us all the more obligated. The next LPM will have to settle the question of increasing the model's size. Beyond Scorpion, which continues to deliver, the post-2031 horizon is written under the name Titan. It integrates robotisation, with Pandragon — derived from the AMIAD programme — to bring forth the first robotic combat units. This is a response to the lethality of the battlefield and to demographic contraction. Next comes digitalisation, with GALAAD — Groupe d'Algorithmes Aéroterrestres pour l'Aide à la Décision — and its data-centric, resilient combat networks down to the lowest tactical echelon. Finally, the renewal of lethality, with loitering munitions, electronic warfare, the Leclerc's successor and the first milestones of the MGCS: a connected platform, reduced mass, distributed protection, robotic coupling."

Industry and alliances

"There will be no scaling up without industry. The condition for a genuine change of pace requires an overhaul of the relationship between the armed forces and their industrial partners. This means, first, systematising bridges between military personnel and engineers — as the Finns do, where start-ups are directly integrated into command posts, for example. It then requires opening architectures, sharing data and broadening the industrial base beyond the established defence industrial base — the automotive sector in particular offers production methods from which the Army could usefully draw. Finally, it demands a joint reflection on the resilience of the industrial tool in the face of new threats: sabotage, strikes or bombardment. At the international level, the same logic of coherence prevails. Effort is concentrated on NATO and the European Union, with an intensificatio nd Poland, as well as with Belgium in the framework of the CaMo programme in particular. To this are added defence agreements and promising opportunities taking shape with the United Arab Emirates."

Wake-up call

"There is urgency. And that is not merely a slogan. Despite the support of elected representatives and the population — which obligates us — administrative obstacles remain, regulatory constraints persist, and there are interlocutors who have 'not yet grasped the measure of the strategic moment.' We must evolve, and fast. The 2030 shock has already begun. The objective is clear: be ready. We are preparing".